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INTRODUCTION
This appeal involves supplemental water-rights claims in the Snake River Basin
Adjudication (“SRBA”) for the Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs, two on-stream reservoirs
owned and operated by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”) in Basin 65.
In most years, annual inflows from the watersheds above the reservoirs exceed available storage
capacity. In such years, if Reclamation were to fill the reservoirs for irrigation storage as soon as
possible after the prior year’s irrigation use, Reclamation would have to “spill” unneeded water
in mid to late spring when stream flows and flood risks are greatest. To help protect downstream
communities and property, over fifty years ago Reclamation developed protocols for filling its
reservoir in a manner that mitigates downstream flooding risks. Under these protocols, now set
out in “flood-control rule curves,” Reclamation passes or releases early inflows to create space
for capturing peak flows later in the year.
In 1993, the Idaho Department of Water Resources (“IDWR”) implemented a
computerized accounting program to track water distribution in Basin 65. As an expedient, the
program treats all reservoir inflows as “diversions” for water-rights purposes. Under this rule, in
any year that Reclamation passes or releases water for flood-control purposes, the United States’
decreed storage rights are satisfied “on paper” before Reclamation physically fills the reservoirs
for irrigation use. Likewise, all reservoir inflows stored after the date of “paper fill” are deemed
“unaccounted for” and available for appropriation by others. Reclamation filed the supplemental
water rights claims to protect its historical reservoir operations in light of IDWR’s novel
accounting procedures. The supplemental claims accept the rule that all reservoir inflows are
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diversions, which limits the United States’ decreed storage rights to first-available flows. But
Reclamation began flood-control operations before 1971, when water rights could be acquired
under Idaho law simply by appropriating water for beneficial use. Under its flood control
operations, Reclamation physically stored — and thereby appropriated for irrigation and other
beneficial uses — the last water flows into the reservoirs (prior to the irrigation season). The
supplemental claims assert beneficial-use rights in these last stream flows.
In a related ruling (on review of IDWR’s similar accounting procedures for federal
reservoirs in Basin 63), the district court acknowledged that the United States and its contract
space holders had “acquired a vested constitutional method water right” through the beneficial
use of waters stored in federal reservoirs after flood-control releases. See U.S. Add. 2 at 17. But
the district court disallowed the United States’ supplemental claims for the Cascade and
Deadwood Reservoirs, on the erroneous view that the Basin 65 claims are precluded by the
“Payette Decree,” a 1986 partial decree of water rights in the Payette River system. As
explained in the United States’ opening brief (U.S. Br. at 29-40), claim preclusion does not apply
because the United States’ supplemental claims are predicated on IDWR’s accounting rule (that
all reservoir inflows are diversions), which was first imposed after the issuance of the Payette
Decree and which departed from the usage of “diversion” in preexisting law.
In their response briefs, Respondents the State of Idaho and Suez Water Idaho, Inc.
(“Suez”) fail to refute that IDWR’s accounting rule materially changed the rules for exercising
reservoir storage rights. Instead, they make three sets of arguments that disregard the rule
change and thus misconstrue the supplemental claims of the United States. First, Respondents
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emphasize the need for “finality” in water adjudications to guard against the “enlargement” of
decreed rights. But because the supplemental claims limit use to one physical fill, they do not
assert enlarged storage rights; they assert enlarged diversion rights, predicated on the novel rule
that all inflows are diversions and on the historic practice (in flood-control years) of passing and
releasing unneeded inflows before physical storage and beneficial use.
Second, the State argues that this Court must disregard IDWR’s reinterpretation of the
United States’ storage rights, because the district court lacked jurisdiction (upon review of the
United States’ supplemental claims) to set aside the accounting procedures. This argument is a
non sequitur. The supplemental claims are predicated on IDWR’s accounting procedures and
presume IDWR’s authority to count all reservoir inflows as “diversions” for water-rights
purposes. Moreover, the validity of IDWR’s accounting procedures is presently before this
Court in a related set of appeals. Whether all reservoir inflows are “diversions” for water-rights
purposes is a legal question pertinent to both sets of appeals. This Court need not (and should
not) disregard that question in either case.
Third, the State and Suez argue that the United States failed to prove the supplemental
claims and that affirmation of the claimed rights would injure other users and interfere with
water-rights administration. These merits arguments misconstrue the supplemental claims, were
never addressed by the district court, and are inconsistent with the district court’s decisions on
the United States’ pending supplemental claims in Basin 63. The district court’s res judicata
ruling should be reversed, and the United States’ supplemental claims in Basin 65 should be
remanded for adjudication in the same manner as the Basin 63 claims.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The United States’ Supplemental Claims Are Not Precluded by the 1986 Partial
Decree in the Payette Adjudication
A.

Claim Preclusion Does Not Apply

As previously explained (U.S. Br. at 29-30), under the doctrine of res judicata, claim
preclusion applies only to claims that actually were or could have been litigated in a prior
proceeding. Berkshire Inv., LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012). Claim
preclusion does not apply where changed factual or legal circumstances give rise to a new claim
that could not have been brought at the time of the initial action. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 (2000); Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 181,
369 P.2d 1010, 1016 (1961); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 162 (1945).
The United States demonstrated that its supplemental claims for the Cascade and Deadwood
Reservoirs could not have been brought in the Payette Adjudication prior to the 1986 Partial
Decree (“Payette Decree”) because the supplemental claims are premised on computerized
accounting procedures that postdate the Payette Decree and reinterpreted the United States’
storage rights in a manner not dictated by the Payette Decree or by preexisting water law. See
U.S. Br. at 31-40. The response briefs of the State and Suez do not show otherwise.
1.

IDWR’s Accounting Procedures Departed from Existing Law

As the United States demonstrated (U.S. Br. at 31-40), IDWR’s 1993 accounting
procedures departed from preexisting law by adopting a novel use of the term “diversion.”
Specifically, for expedience, IDWR adopted a dictionary definition equating “diversion” with
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any change in the physical course of a waterway. See U.S. Add. 3 at 65, ¶ 30 (citing Webster’s II
New College Dictionary 339 (3d ed. 2005) (“Diverted means ‘[t]o turn aside from a direction or
course.”)) Using this definition of “diversion,” IDWR determined for the first time that “all
natural flow[s] that enter[] a federal on stream reservoir” are “diverted” for water-rights purposes
and must be charged toward the satisfaction of decreed rights, whether or not the flows are
appropriated for irrigation or other use. Id.
This novel approach, the United States explained (U.S. Br. at 35), “disassociate[d] water
diversions from water appropriation.” Under longstanding Idaho water law, the term “diversion”
had always been used together with, or as a synonym for, “appropriation.” See, e.g., Marshall v.
Niagara Springs Orchard Co., 22 Idaho 144, 125 P. 208, 210 (1912); Branstetter v. Williams, 8
Idaho 257, 67 P. 800, 804 (1902). Reflecting this understanding, the Idaho Constitution
enshrines “[t]he right to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream
to beneficial uses.” Idaho Const., Article 15, § 3 (emphasis added). This Court has determined
that water can be appropriated for water-rights purposes without a physical diversion, e.g., to
preserve instream recreational use. See State Dept. of Parks v. Idaho Dept. of Water Admin., 96
Idaho 440, 444-445, 530 P.2d 924, 928-29 (1974); see also Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States,
144 Idaho 1, 7, 156 P.3d 502, 508 (2007) (diversion not necessary for “valid appropriative right
for stock watering”). But this Court has never held that water can be “diverted” for water-rights
purposes without an appropriation. Cf. In re SRBA, 157 Idaho 385, 389, 336 P.3d 792, 796
(2014) (addressing the right of an “appropriator” to “divert” under a storage right).
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By treating all reservoir inflows as “diversions,” the computerized accounting
procedures count two types of “diversions” that are not associated with appropriations. First and
foremost, when Reclamation allows natural stream flows to pass through an on-stream reservoir
without physically filling the reservoirs — i.e., when dam outflows equal or exceed reservoir
inflows — Reclamation is not removing water from the river or otherwise “appropriating” water
in any meaningful sense. See U.S. Br. at 32-33. It is axiomatic that any owner of a water right
may choose not to exercise the right. Cf. Jenkins v. State Dept. of Water Resources, 103 Idaho
384, 388-390, 647 P.2d 1256, 1260-62 (1982) (addressing risks of nonuse). Likewise, when
available water flows are more than sufficient to satisfy an owner’s annual right of appropriation,
the owner has discretion when to exercise the right within the temporal limits (if any) imposed
by a relevant license or decree. See, e.g., Dunn v. Boyd, 46 Idaho 717, 217 P. 2, 3 (1928) (court
may fix dates within which an appropriator “may divert”). Nothing in the law of prior
appropriation suggests a different rule for on-stream storage reservoirs.
Second, as also explained (U.S. Br. at 37-38), inflows stored and released for floodcontrol purposes are not appropriated under Idaho law. If it were possible for Reclamation to
perfectly predict winter and spring precipitation, associated snowmelt and runoff rates, and other
factors influencing reservoir inflows, Reclamation could satisfy its reservoir storage rights and
meet flood control objectives with one physical fill per year. Specifically, Reclamation could
exercise its discretion (as above) to let unneeded natural stream flows pass, until the time it needs
to begin storing natural flows to physically fill the reservoirs for the irrigation season. But
because Reclamation cannot forecast reservoir inflows until it can assess actual winter snowfalls,
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Reclamation starts forecasting in January. Reclamation begins filling its reservoirs earlier (preforecasts) on the assumption that there will be no runoff in excess of available reservoir capacity.
Once reliable runoff forecasts can be made, Reclamation passes through inflow and, as
necessary, releases a portion of the stored water as dictated by its flood-control rule curves, and
then fills the reservoirs during peak flows. During years when inflows exceed available reservoir
capacity, 1 this method of filling the reservoirs results in a partial physical “refill” (to compensate
for flood-control releases), not simply the passing of unneeded flows prior to the exercise of
reservoir storage rights.
Nonetheless, the net effect on water appropriation is the same. As the United States
explained (U.S. Br. at 37-38), regulating stream flows to avert flooding is not a “use” of water
per se, and has never been held to constitute an appropriation requiring a license or decreed
water right under Idaho law. Thus, at the time of the Payette Adjudication, Reclamation’s
practice of passing and releasing water for flood-control purposes before filling the reservoirs for
irrigation and power purposes was consistent with Idaho law and did not interfere with its
licensed storage rights (ultimately confirmed in the decree).
2.

The State and Suez Fail to Refute the Material Change in Circumstances

Contrary to the State’s characterization (State Br. at 24-25), the foregoing argument does
not rely on the United States’ “subjective[]” view, at the time of the Payette Decree, that its

1

The available capacity is total capacity minus carryover, after distributions for irrigation have
been made and when the new storage season begins.
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historic reservoir operations were consistent with the laws of prior appropriation. Rather, the
United States relies on longstanding Idaho legal authority on water appropriation, together with
the absence of any Idaho precedent treating flood-control as an appropriation, both of which the
State ignores. Because the State cannot refute the United States’ legal argument, the State
instead argues (State Br. at 25-39) that this Court cannot consider the changed legal
interpretation, because IDWR’s accounting procedures cannot be challenged in the SRBA
proceedings. But changed factual and legal circumstances are undisputedly relevant to claim
preclusion. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho at 226, 999 P.2d at 881; Berry, 84 Idaho at 181, 369 P.2d at
1016; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 324 U.S. at 162. Demonstrating that the 1993 accounting
procedures effected changed circumstances is not the same as arguing that the procedures should
be set aside. See pp. 22-26, infra.
For its part, Suez argues that treating all reservoir inflows as diversions for water-rights
purposes has always been “mandated by Idaho’s Prior Appropriation Doctrine,” Suez Br. at 31,
and that the “relevant * * * legal principles” at the time of the Payette Adjudication “were
exactly the same as they are now,” id. at 14. But Suez fails to make its case. First, Suez
contends (Suez Br. at 31, 33-34) that Reclamation must be charged with diverting all available
inflows toward its decreed rights to “prevent impermissible enlargement” of those rights and to
ensure that Reclamation does not “stor[e] more water than authorized” under its decreed or
licensed rights. This argument does not follow. The owner of a storage right (or any other water
right) does not enlarge the right merely by declining to satisfy it with first available flows. As
the United States’ explained (U.S. Br. at 34), the risk of not storing first available flows — i.e.,
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the risk that later flows will not be available to satisfy the full storage right — falls solely on the
owner of the right.
Second, Suez argues (Suez Br. at 23) that a duty to use first available flows can be found
in the “four corners” of the Payette Decree (or previous licenses). But Suez points to no specific
text to support this assertion. The Payette Decree confirmed the United States’ rights to “use”
water from the Payette River, for “irrigation” and “power storage” and for “irrigation from
storage” and “power from storage,” in amounts up to 700,000 acre feet per annum (“AFA”) for
Cascade Reservoir and 163,000 AFA for Deadwood Reservoir. R. 533-34. The Payette Decree
did not address “diversion” rights or impose “diversion” limits. See U.S. Br. at 38. To be sure,
the United States’ rights to appropriate water under the Payette Decree are limited to the decreed
storage amounts. See Glenn Dale Ranches v. Shaub, 94 Idaho 585, 588, 424 P.2d 1029, 1032
(1972). But the Payette Decree simply confirmed that number based on the earlier state licenses.
The Payette Decree (and earlier licenses) did not temporally limit when Reclamation may divert,
nor specify that Reclamation must divert and appropriate first available flows.
Third, Suez argues (Suez Br. at 35) that Reclamation must be “incentivized” to use first
available flows to “make more water available for juniors and maximize the use of the State’s
water resources.” Suez correctly observes (Suez Br. at 18) that Idaho water law requires
“beneficial use” and prohibits “waste.” See Idaho Ground Water Appropriators v. Idaho Dept.
of Water Resources, 160 Idaho 119, 131, 369 P.3d 897, 909 (2016). Suez fails to show,
however, that Reclamation’s flood-control operations contribute to waste. As the United States
explained (U.S. Br. at 33), flows that Reclamation passes or releases for flood-control operations
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are “never removed from the river or made unavailable to other water users or prospective
appropriators.” Suez’s real argument is that flood-control operations change the timing of stream
flows. Suez contends (Suez Br. at 35, 38) that Reclamation should be compelled to store first
available flows in order to make more water available to junior appropriators during the
irrigation season. But Reclamation passes or releases flows for flood-control purposes only in
years when the failure to do so would cause stream levels to rise above the flow-rate target for
flood control. See U.S. Br. at 17. Raising stream flow levels at times of flood risk does not
make more water available at times of greatest irrigation need. For downstream water users with
storage capacity and storage rights, the change in timing is irrelevant.
This leaves Suez with the anomalous argument (Suez Br. at 36-37) that reservoir inflows
“must count toward the satisfaction” of the United States’ decreed storage rights because
“IDWR’s distribution of water * * * has nothing to do with beneficial use.” Suez argues (id.)
that once IDWR “distributes” water to the United States’ storage rights, Reclamation must store
and put that water to beneficial use or lose such rights. But this assertion says nothing about
whether IDWR’s newfound “distribution” departed from preexisting law. IDWR did not begin
“distributing” water to the United States via the accounting procedures until 1993. 2 As explained
(pp. 4-7, supra), by “distributing” first-available flows to the United States storage rights —
notwithstanding Reclamation’s flood-control operations — IDWR took away Reclamation’s

2

IDWR does not physically distribute water to the reservoirs. The “distribution” is a paper
exercise utilized by IDWR to track the satisfaction of water rights.
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discretion to delay the exercise of its rights for flood-control purposes. This was (and is) a
fundamental reinterpretation of the United States’ storage rights.
Suez’s contention that IDWR’s “accounting methodologies * * * do not define water
rights or dictate Idaho’s law of prior appropriation” is misplaced. IDWR’s task is to “distribute
water * * * in accordance with the prior appropriation doctrine.” In re SRBA, 157 Idaho at 393,
336 P.3d at 800 (citing Idaho Code § 42-602). In this regard, IDWR is charged with
“follow[ing] the law,” not making the law. Id. Nonetheless, this Court has recognized IDWR’s
discretion “to determine when [the quantity amount] has been met for each individual decree[d]”
right, id. at 394, 336 P.3d at 801, including the discretion to regulate the “use [of] decreed water
right[s]” in light of the “public’s interest in [the] valuable commodity” of water. See American
Falls Reservoir Distr. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. of Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 880, 154 P.3d 433, 451
(2007). In the present case, this Court could affirm IDWR’s accounting procedures as an
accounting expedient, or it could find the procedures consistent with prior appropriation in the
abstract (i.e., without regard to how reservoir storage rights historically have been exercised).
Neither determination would be inconsistent with the United States’ argument that the
accounting procedures changed the rules when adopted. In other words, as previously explained
(U.S. Br. at 40), the fact that IDWR’s accounting procedures depart from preexisting law does
not make the procedures per se improper. If this Court affirms IDWR’s Basin 63 Accounting
Order, the rule that all inflows are diversions presumably will carry the force of law.
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3.

The United States’ Supplemental Claims Were Not “Ripe” at the Time of
the Payette Adjudication

The State’s argument (State Br. at 19-25) that the United States’ supplemental claims
were “ripe” in 1969 (when the Payette Adjudication was initiated) is readily controverted. The
United States acknowledged (U.S. Br. at 30-31) that its supplemental claims “are based on the
diversion and beneficial use of water that dates back to before 1965.” But as the United States
explained (id. at 31-35), the supplemental claims are also “inextricably bound up with” the logic
of the 1993 accounting procedures, which postdate the Payette Adjudication. Following IDWR’s
accounting procedures, the supplemental claims disassociate “diversions” from “appropriations”
and assert diversion rights (rights to divert for irrigation and power storage) in amounts that
exceed appropriation rights (rights to use stored water for irrigation and power). These claims
are possible (and understandable) only in the context of the new rule that all reservoirs inflows
are diversions, a rule that did not control the United States decreed rights until after the 1993
accounting rules were implemented. 3
4.

The United States Was Not Obligated to Seek a Flood-Control “Remark”
in Anticipation of the Present Legal Controversy

There is likewise no merit to the State’s attempt (State Br. at 22-25) to ground claim
preclusion on the United States’ supposed failure to seek a “refill” remark in the Payette

3

Contrary to the State’s argument (State Br. at 20), the United States does not contend that claim
preclusion is inapplicable because it would have been “impossible” to challenge IDWR’s 1993
accounting procedures at the time of the Payette Adjudication. The supplemental claims do not
challenge the accounting procedures, just the opposite; the supplemental claims are predicated
upon the accounting procedures. See pp. 22-26, infra.
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Adjudication to protect its flood-control operations. While acknowledging (id. at 22) that
reservoir operations are not themselves a “beneficial use” of water, the State fails to appreciate
the corollary point: not all reservoir operations are a “use” of water for purposes of water-rights
regulation. Reservoir operations that do not implicate the availability of water for appropriation
and use by others are simply outside of Idaho water-use law (law of prior appropriation). To be
more precise, the United States’ historic flood-control operations were outside of such law, until
IDWR adopted accounting procedures that treat all reservoir inflows as “diversions” subject to
water-rights administration.
In this context, the repeated assertions by the State and Suez that the Payette Decree did
not authorize flood-control operations are beside the point. See State Br. at 22-25, 43, Suez Br.
at 6, 15, 23, 43. If a water right historically has been exercised in a manner contrary to principles
of prior appropriation — e.g., if a group of water users on a tributary historically have allowed
out-of-priority use under certain conditions — the beneficiaries of such an arrangement
reasonably must seek a remark memorializing such practice when the user’s water rights are
formally adjudicated. See U.S. Br. at 35-36. This is so because the historic practice would be
unprotected by law and contrary to the terms of a decree if not memorialized therein. Id. But
neither the State nor Suez argue that the United States needed a license or decreed water right to
conduct flood-control operations incidental to irrigation and power storage, or that the United
States could have acquired such right. The absence of flood-control authorization — either as a
“use” of the decreed storage rights or by way of a “remark” — can be a material omission with
claim-preclusive effect only if authorization was (and is) required.

13

At the time of the Payette Adjudication, the United States’ flood-control operations were
not contrary to the terms of its licenses or to Idaho water law. There was no Idaho statute,
regulation, or case precedent identifying flood control operations incidental to reservoir storage
as a “use” of water requiring a separate water right. Indeed, there is no such authority to this
day. In its Basin 63 Accounting Order, IDWR justified its accounting procedures on the view
that all inflows are diversions toward reservoir storage rights. See U.S. Add., Tab 3 at 37-38
(¶¶106-111) 40-41 (¶¶ 116-124), 65 (¶ 30). IDWR did not determine that the flood-control
operations are a “beneficial use” of water. This is not, as Suez alone suggests (Suez Br. at 20),
because flood-control operations are “sloppy” or “waste[ful].” The United States’ flood-control
operations have broad public benefits, which neither IDWR nor Suez denies. See Suez Br. at 46.
Because flood control is undisputedly beneficial, it is not a “beneficial use” of water only
because it does not implicate water appropriation and use. 4 As IDWR acknowledged in the
Basin 63 Accounting Order, this fact makes flood-control operations “independent of the water
rights system and prior appropriation.” Id. at 74 (¶ 53).

4

The State and Suez cannot have it both ways. If regulating flows for flood-control purposes is
not a water use, a license or decreed right cannot be required. To the extent that the State and
Suez are arguing that flood-control operations are water uses, they are arguing for a change to
Idaho law. The United States’ supplemental claims do not assert storage rights for flood control,
because IDWR has never treated flood-control as a water use. If this Court determines that
flood-control operations are a water use, it should remand to enable the United States to conform
its supplemental claims accordingly. Except for the addition of the flood-control purpose, the
supplemental claims (and proof required) would not change.
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Suez speculates (Suez Br. at 15) that, in the absence of Idaho precedent specifically
excluding flood-control operations from water-use regulation, Reclamation “could have and
should have wondered” whether its flood-control operations required a water-rights license or
decree. But the ability to “wonder” about potential legal issues is not the same as the ability to
assert a claim on a specific accounting rule not yet adopted. 5 As just explained, IDWR’s
accounting procedures for federal on-stream reservoirs are not based on the view that storing
water or regulating flows for flood-control purposes constitutes a water use. IDWR’s accounting
procedures are based on the rule that all inflows are diversions, which prevents Reclamation
from letting any available inflows pass for any reason. The supplemental claims make no sense
and could not have been filed in the absence of this novel accounting rule. 6
Contrary to the State’s argument (State Br. at 23-24 & n. 27), the “risk” that flood-control
operations pose to the United States’ ability to physically fill the Cascade and Deadwood
Reservoirs is not germane to whether the United States could or should have brought its
supplemental claims in the Payette Adjudication. The United States acknowledged (U.S. Br. at

5

For this reason, issues about “refill” or flood-control operations that arose in other contexts (see
State Br. at 21 n. 24) prior to or around the time of the Payette Adjudication do not prove that the
supplemental claims could have been filed in the Payette Adjudication.

6

The State’s observation (State Br. at 24 n. 28) that the district court adjudicated a federal
reservoir claim with a flood-control remark after IDWR adopted its accounting procedures says
nothing about Reclamation’s obligations at the time of the Payette Decree. Nor is there any
significance to the State’s argument (id.) that the United States could have sought a flood control
remark when the United States’ decreed rights were confirmed in the SRBA. See U.S. Br. at 4-5,
16. The State has never argued that the 2003 partial decrees have claim-preclusive effect.
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17) that Reclamation’s flood-control operations make it more difficult for Reclamation to
physically fill the reservoirs to maximum capacity for irrigation use. Reclamation assumed this
risk to provide a reasonable degree of protection against downstream flooding, and Reclamation
developed flood-control rule curves to manage the risk of non-filling. It does not follow, as the
State intimates (State Br. at 23-24 & n. 27), that the United States assumed the risk of claim
preclusion by not raising the legal status of its flood-control operations at the time of the Payette
Adjudication. These are completely different issues.
B.

The United States’ Supplemental Claims Are Not Precluded by Statutory
Forfeiture or By Decree Language Referencing Statutory Forfeiture

As explained in the United States’ opening brief (U.S. Br. at 23-24), the district court
disallowed the United States’ supplemental claims on the grounds of res judicata and two
additional, purportedly independent reasons: (1) because the Payette Decree purportedly
referenced forfeiture under former Idaho Code § 42-1411 (1969) (repealed), and (2) by operation
of that 1969 finality statute. See R. 2512-2518. As explained (U.S. Br. at 26-27), these are not
independent grounds for claim preclusion. The 1969 finality statute is properly construed as
“memorializ[ing] * * * the application of res judicata to water adjudications.” See State Dept. of
Ecology v. Acquavella, 112 Wash. App. 729, 739, 51 P.3d 800, 805 (Wash. App. 2002)
(interpreting an analogous state statute). Because the statute did not dictate the forfeiture of
claims beyond the rule of claim preclusion, there can be no statutory forfeiture or forfeiture by
reference to the statute for the reason already addressed: claim preclusion does not apply.
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1.

The 1969 Finality Statute Embodied Res Judicata Principles and
Limitations

While asserting that the United States’ interpretation of the 1969 finality statute lacks
merit (State Br. at 15-17), the State offers no alternative interpretation. Instead, the State makes
generic observations about finality that are not disputed. For example, the State observes (id. at
15) that general stream adjudications are unique statutory proceedings warranting their own
finality rule. The United States agrees. As the United States explained (U.S. Br. at 26-27), claim
preclusion — the loss of claims that “could have been” brought in earlier an earlier action
whether or not the claims were actually litigated — applies to claims arising from the “same
transaction or series of transactions.” Marivalla v. J.R. Simplot Co., 161 Idaho 455, 459, 387 P.
3d 123, 127 (2016) (citing Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P.3d
943, 951 (2012)). This “transactional” test does not fit general stream adjudications, which are
not limited to any particular transaction or series of transactions giving rise to water rights, but
instead are initiated by a statutorily-authorized notice calling out all claims to the use of water
from a particular water system or source. See Idaho Code § 42-1407. Accordingly, the manifest
purpose of former § 42-1411 (1969) was to clarify that claim preclusion would apply to any all
claims that could be filed in response to such notice.
The State also stresses that finality is “essential” to general stream adjudications. See
State Br. at 16 (quoting Idaho Ground Water Assoc. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 160
Idaho 119, 128, 369 P.3d 897, 906 (2016)); see also State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 12, 16, 951 P.2d
943, 947 (1998)). Again, the United States concurs. The State cites a 2010 brief that the United
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States filed in the district court in proceedings on the “Lemhi Decree,” a 1982 partial decree of
water rights on the Lemhi River similar to the Payette Decree. See State Br. at 12-13 & 15 n. 15.
In that brief, the United States observed that the 1969 finality statute reflected (1) “a bedrock
principle concerning the finality of general adjudication decrees,” see State Br. at Tab E at 20;
and (2) the “importance of obtaining finality in general adjudication decrees based on the
principle of res judicata,” id. at 23 (emphasis added). The State mistakenly implies (State Br. at
15 n. 15) that the United States has changed its position on these issues. It has not. As reflected
in the 2010 brief, the United States has consistently interpreted the 1969 finality statute as
mandating finality “based on the principle of res judicata.” State Br., Tab E at 23.
The State misconstrues this argument by failing to acknowledge that res judicata has
equitable limitations. Specifically, res judicata bars claims not actually litigated by the parties in
a prior suit (claim preclusion) only when the claims could have been brought in that prior
proceeding. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 (2000);
Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 181, 369 P.2d 1010, 1016 (1961); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 162 (1945). As previously explained (U.S. Br. at 27), the language of
the 1969 finality statute implied the same equitable limitation. The statute provided for
forfeiture in the event of a water user’s “fail[ure] to appear and submit proof of [a] claim.” See
Idaho Code § 42-1411 (1969) (emphasis added). A litigant cannot “fail” at a task the litigant had
no reasonable ability to perform. To construe the 1969 finality statute as mandating the
forfeiture for claims that could not have been brought in a general adjudication would be
“unreasonably harsh” and “arbitrary,” contrary to ordinary rules of statutory construction. See
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Jasso v. Camas Cty. 151 Idaho 790, 798, 264 P.3d 897, 905 (2011); Avista Corp., Inc. v. Wolfe,
549 F.3d 1239, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 2008).
The State does not dispute this analysis. Instead, the State incorrectly describes the
United States’ position as “disparaging” the “doctrine of res judicata” itself. See State Br. at 16
n. 17. Contrary to the State’s characterization (id. at 16), the United States did not argue that the
1969 finality statute would unfairly “penalize” water users or result in an “arbitrary forfeiture of
property rights” in the ordinary circumstance, i.e., when applied to water-rights claims that could
have been asserted in a properly-noticed general stream adjudication. The United States simply
demonstrated that the 1969 finality statute cannot reasonably be construed as mandating the
forfeiture of claims that could not have been brought in the subject general adjudication. Again,
the State and Suez do not argue otherwise. It is true that the State and Suez argue that the United
States reasonably could have (and thus should have) brought its supplemental claims in the
Payette Adjudication. But that argument is erroneous for reasons already discussed above and is
no response to the issue of statutory interpretation.
2.

The 1969 Finality Statute Did Not Apply to Partial Decrees

In addition to demonstrating that the 1969 finality statute is properly interpreted as
embodying the principles of res judicata, the United States also made the further point (U.S. Br.
at 27) that the forfeiture provision of the 1969 finality statute did not apply to the Payette Decree,
because that decree was a partial decree. The 1969 finality statute stated in relevant part that the
“[t]he decree” in a comprehensive stream adjudication “shall be conclusive as to the rights of all
existing claimants upon the water system,” and that “when [such] a decree has been entered, any
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water user who has been joined and who failed to * * * submit proof of his claim * * * shall be
held to have forfeited all [then existing] rights.” Idaho Code § 42-1411 (1969). It is undisputed
that that this forfeiture provision was repealed before the entry of such a decree in the Payette
Adjudication, and that the Payette Adjudication remained incomplete at the time it was
consolidated with the SRBA. Accordingly, under the plain terms of the statute, forfeiture under
§ 42-1411 (1969) never attached to the Payette River system.
In making this argument, the United States did not contend, as the State implies (State Br.
at 13-15) that the 1986 Payette Decree was not a “final” judgment, or that the decree lacked
claim-preclusive effect under res judicata principles. To the contrary, the United States
acknowledged that the Payette Adjudication court certified the 1986 partial decree as “final”
under Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(b), with the intent of entering a final judgment as to all claims that
were or could have been brought within the Payette River basin, except for expressly excluded
claims. Consistent with this understanding, the United States argued below (R. 1907-08, R.
2273-77, 2366-69) and in its opening brief (U.S. Br. at 29-40) that its supplemental claims fall
outside the rule of claim preclusion only because they could not have been brought in the Payette
Adjudication. The United States did not argue that the Payette Decree lacked claim-preclusive
effect as to claims that could have been brought in the Payette Adjudication.
As for the 1969 finality statute, the United States observed (U.S. Br. at 27-29) that if
former § 42-1411 “somehow could be construed as compelling preclusion beyond the [equitable]
rule” of claims preclusion — i.e., if the statute is construed as mandating forfeiture of waterrights claims that could not have been brought within the Payette Adjudication — such arbitrary
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forfeiture should be limited, per the plain terms of the statute, to decrees “conclusive as to the
rights of all existing claimants upon the [subject] water system.” The State acknowledges (State
Br. at 17) that the 1986 Payette Decree was not “conclusive” of all rights on the Payette River,
but insists that the “partial” nature of the 1986 decree makes no difference with respect to the
forfeiture, because the Payette Adjudication court intended the 1986 partial decree to trigger
statutory forfeiture.
That argument cannot be sustained. As the United States explained (U.S. Br. at 24), the
1979 Director’s Report included a “recommended decree” comprehensive of “all of the rights
* * * to the waters of the Payette River.” R. 524. In this context, the report recommended a
“conclusion of law” that entry of the “recommended decree” would result in the forfeiture of
rights “as provided in Section 42-1411.” Id. In contrast, the Payette Adjudication court issued a
“partial decree” that excluded specified claims and did not reference statutory forfeiture. R. 452.
Thus, while it is undisputed that the Payette Adjudication court entered a final decree with claimpreclusive effect, there is nothing in the text of Payette Decree specifically addressing whether
the final partial decree would trigger statutory forfeiture. Moreover, even if the court had made
such a proclamation, it cannot be given effect where the statute required a decree comprehensive
of all claims. See Idaho Code § 42-1411 (1969). No court can by fiat change the terms of a
statute. On this issue of statutory interpretation, the State has no response.
Instead, the State argues (State Br. at 11-13) that the United States waived its
“challenges” to the 1969 finality statute and 1986 Payette Decree by not raising them in district
court. But the United States is not challenging the 1969 statute or the Payette Decree; the United
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States merely notes that the district court misconstrued the plain terms of the statute and the
decree. Moreover, the United States made these observations (U.S. Br. at 27-29) in response to
the district court’s holding that the 1969 statute and the 1986 Payette Decree operate
independently of res judicata principles and claim preclusion. R. 2512-2518. The State did not
make that argument below. See, e.g., R. 2288-89 (equating the terms of the 1986 Partial Decree
and 1969 forfeiture statute with the “principles of res judicata”). In any event, as just noted, the
State and Suez do not argue on appeal for an interpretation of the 1969 finality statute that would
provide for the forfeiture of claims that could not have been brought within the Payette
Adjudication. Therefore, the question whether the Payette Decree (as a partial decree) triggered
forfeiture under the 1969 finality statute need not be resolved.
II.

This Court May Consider Whether IDWR’s Accounting Procedures Departed from
Preexisting Law
Instead of attempting to refute the United States’ argument that IDWR’s 1993 accounting

procedures fundamentally reinterpreted the United States’ storage rights (see pp. 4-7, supra), the
State erroneously contends (State Br. at 25-39) that this Court may not consider the change. To
consider the departure from preexisting law, the State argues, would sanction a challenge to
IDWR’s accounting procedures, which may only be brought in proceedings under the Idaho
Administrative Procedure Act (“Idaho APA”). This argument cannot stand.
A.

The United States’ Supplemental Claims Presume the Validity of the 1993
Accounting Procedures

To begin with, the United States’ supplemental claims plainly do not challenge IDWR’s
1993 accounting procedures. In demonstrating that the accounting procedures departed from the
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preexisting law, the United States showed why its supplemental claims could not have been
brought in the Payette Adjudication. Contrary to the State’s arguments (State Br. at 26 n.29, 30),
this demonstration was not a refusal to “accept” the accounting procedures or a request that the
accounting procedures be set aside. The supplemental claims can only proceed if the accounting
procedures (and rule all reservoir inflows are diversions) remain in place.
Nor is the State correct to suggest (State Br. at 30) that the United States’ present
argument was not made below. The United States explained below that the IDWR’s accounting
procedures “upended” the historic practice of storing for irrigation use after flood control
releases, R. 2273, and left federal storage rights “unprotected,” R. 2271. This is so, the United
States showed, because the accounting procedures introduced the concept of “paper fill,” which
“severed the connection between physical fill and * * * reservoir accounting,” leaving the
existing storage rights “incapable of protecting” physical storage following flood-control
releases. R. 2273-74. This is a just another way of saying that the accounting procedures
disassociated diversions from appropriations. See pp. 4-7, supra.
The State is also mistaken in arguing (State Br. at 30) that the United States’ arguments
are based on a “mischaracteriz[ation]” of the district court’s decision. In finding the United
States’ supplemental claims foreclosed by the Payette Decree, the district court relied in part on
the proposition that “a claimant wishing to preserve a historical method of administration * * *
must raise that issue at the time [a] claim is adjudicated.” R. 2515-2516. The district court used
the term “historical method of administration” to mean a “scheme” for water distribution that
“might not pass muster” under the “prior appropriation system.” See Memorandum Decision and
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Order, SRBA Subcase 63-33732 at 6 (Sept. 1, 2016) (U.S. Add. 1). By invoking this rule, the
district court necessarily (and mistakenly) assumed (1) that the United States’ flood-control
operations — which do not involve any appropriation or claim of priority use — would not “pass
muster” under the law unless “memorialized” in a decree; and (2) that IDWR’s accounting
procedures simply enforced the preexisting rules of prior appropriation. See U.S. Br. at 35-36.
In any event, whether or not the district court recognized the relevance of the issue, the
fact that IDWR’s diversion rule departed from preexisting law matters to claim preclusion. The
State seems to argue (State Br. at 31) that the United States was required to challenge IDWR’s
accounting procedures as a condition precedent to filing its supplemental claims. This Court has
held that the Idaho APA “provides the procedures for challenging [an] accounting method”
adopted by IDWR, In re SRBA, 157 Idaho at 394, 336 P.3d at 801, and that a party may not bring
an “as applied” challenge to the constitutionality of IDWR regulations without exhausting
administrative remedies. American Falls Reservoir Distr. No. 2, 143 Idaho at 870-72, 154 P.3d
at 441-43. But neither decision supports the self-contradictory argument (State Br. at 31) that a
party must challenge accounting procedures in order to bring claims based on the procedures.
Nor is there any merit to the State’s argument (State Br. at 31-36) that the United States
improperly augmented the record on appeal by citing IDWR’s Basin 63 Accounting Order and
two related district court decisions, which are included in the addendum to the United States’
brief. The United States cited the district court decisions (U.S. Add. 1-2) to advise this Court of
the status of the United States’ supplemental claims for federal on-stream reservoirs in Basin 63
and the status of the district’s court related decision on review of IDWR’s Basin 63 Accounting
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Order, which is presently on appeal to this Court. See U.S. Br. at 8-9, 21-22, 40-42. The State
does not argue that it is improper to advise this Court of related claims, decisions, and appeals.
As for IDWR’s Basin 63 Accounting Order (U.S. Add. 3), the United States did not cite
that order, as the State contends (State Br. at 31), to “cobble together an administrative record” to
challenge the order or to challenge IDWR’s informal accounting procedures for Basin 65. As
previously explained (U.S. Br. at 18), IDWR’s computerized accounting procedures for Basins
01, 63, and 65 were all adopted informally, without an administrative order or rule making. Id.
at 18, 21. In 2013, on its own volition, IDWR initiated “contested case” proceedings 7 to review
its accounting procedures for Basin 63. Id. at 21. Those proceedings culminated in the Basin 63
Accounting Order, which is the first (and only) formal action setting out IDWR’s accounting
rules for federal on-stream reservoirs and the rationale for those rules. Id. at 21-22. The United
States cited the Basin 63 Accounting Order as legal authority that explains the accounting rules
and their departure from preexisting law. See U.S. Br. at 9, 18-20, 21-22, 37-39. While
mistakenly arguing (State Br. at 31) that the departure is irrelevant to claim preclusion, the State
does not argue (nor could it) that the Basin 63 Accounting Order is not final agency action on
matters committed by law to IDWR. See In re SRBA, 157 Idaho at 393-94, 336 P.3d at 800-801.
Instead, the State argues that “it cannot and should not be assumed” that the Basin 63
Accounting Order “serves as a substitute for a fully developed administrative record and final

7

A “contested case” is any [agency] proceeding * * * that may result in the issuance of an
order.” Idaho Code § 67-5240.
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order of the Director on the Water District 65 accounting system.” To the extent the State is
arguing that a “fully developed administrative record” is a prerequisite for challenging the Basin
65 accounting procedures, the State’s argument is misplaced. For reasons stated, the United
States’ supplemental claims do not challenge the Basin 65 accounting procedures. To the extent
the State is arguing that the Basin 63 Accounting Order is not relevant for understanding the
Basin 65 accounting procedures, the State is simply mistaken. 8 The State does not contend (and
cannot show) that IDWR’s accounting rule treating all reservoir inflows as diversions operates
differently in Basin 65 from its operation in Basin 63. Nor does the State explain how the state
engineer’s expertise (see State Br. at 34) could matter on this issue. Whether Reclamation had
discretion, prior to IDWR’s accounting procedures, to determine when to exercise its reservoir
storage rights is a question of law. That IDWR’s accounting procedures eliminated any
discretion possessed by Reclamation is beyond dispute.
B.

This Court May Determine the Validity of IDWR’s Accounting Rule on
Diversions

In addition to explaining that claim preclusion does not apply (U.S. Br. at 29-40), the
United States also explained (id. at 40-42) that the supplemental claims would be unnecessary if
IDWR’s accounting rule on diversions is set aside. Stated differently, if this Court determines

8

The State argues (State Br. at 32, n. 37) that there are “significant differences” between the
Payette River Basin (Basin 65) and the Boise River Basin (Basin 63). But none of the
differences proffered by the State is relevant to the application of IDWR’s accounting rule
treating all inflows as diversions. Among other things, the proffered differences in the federal
statutes and contracts that govern the operation of the reservoirs are irrelevant to whether historic
reservoir operations resulted in beneficial-use water rights under State law.
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that flows passed or released for flood control purposes are not properly counted toward the
satisfaction of federal storage rights, even as an accounting expedient, there would be no legal
basis for the United States supplemental claims. 9 See U.S. Br. at 5-6, 35.
Contrary to the State and Suez’s argument (State Br. at 26-29, Suez Br. at 26-29), this
Court has jurisdiction to address that issue on appeal. In arguing that the district court lacked
jurisdiction (id.), the State and Suez mistakenly rely on this Court’s decision on Basin-Wide
Issue 17. See In re SRBA, 147 Idaho 385, 336 P.3d 792; see also U.S. Br. at 20-21 (explaining
proceedings). In that case, this Court recognized that IDWR has broad authority to oversee the
distribution of water to water rights and to choose accounting methodologies to determine when
the quantity element of a water right is satisfied. In re SRBA, 147 Idaho at 393-94, 336 P.3d at
800-801. This Court held that the district court did not “abuse its discretion” when “declining to
address when the quantity element of a storage right is considered filled” or in “stating that such

9

As explained (U.S. Br. at 7), Black Canyon Irrigation District (“Black Canyon”) objected to the
United States’ supplemental claims on the theory that the claims were unnecessary. The United
States did not similarly object to its own supplemental claims, but did note that the issue of
reservoir “refill” was then pending in the proceedings on Basin-Wide Issue 17. See R. 22 & n. 7.
The United States advised that it would withdraw its supplemental claims as unnecessary if the
district court determined, in the basin-wide proceedings, that the United States’ decreed rights
could be exercised consistent with flood-control operations. Id. That question was subsequently
taken up in the “contested case” proceedings on the Basin 63 Accounting Procedures. See U.S.
Br. at 9, 21-22. In its opening brief, the United States noted Black Canyon’s objection and the
related appeal regarding the Basin 63 Accounting Order to explain the relatedness of all pending
appeals. See id. at 40-41. Thus, there is no merit to the State’s argument (State Br. at 25-26) that
the United States’ “waived” a challenge it did not make to the district court’s ruling on Black
Canyon’s objection. The United States presents its view herein on the jurisdictional question,
solely in response to the State’s extended argument on the issue (State Br. at 26-29).

27

a determination was within [IDWR’s] discretion.” Id. at 394, 336 P.3d at 801. In so holding,
this Court did not find that IDWR has exclusive authority to resolve all legal issues relevant to
the satisfaction of water storage rights. Id. Nor did this Court preemptively address the district
court’s jurisdiction to address the “refill” issue in connection with the adjudication of the United
States’ supplemental water-rights claim. Id.
The State also errs in relying on Idaho Code § 42-1401D. State Br. at 27. That section
provides that “[r]eview of an agency action * * * shall not be heard in any water rights
adjudication.” Idaho Code § 42-1401D. But this mandate is limited to agency “action * * *
subject to judicial review” under the Idaho APA. Id. As just noted, IDWR has not issued a final
rule or order on its Basin 65 accounting procedures. See § 67-5201(3)(a) (“ ‘agency action’
means * * * the whole or part of a rule or order”). A district court’s consideration of a legal
issue that arises with respect to the adjudication of a water right does not constitute “review of
* * * agency action” simply because the same issue arises in a related “contested case”
proceeding.
In any event, as the United States further explained (U.S. Br. at 41), IDWR’s Basin 63
Accounting Order is now before this Court in a related set of appeals. The question whether all
reservoirs inflows are diversions is a legal issue common to those appeals (involving IDWR’s
Basin 63 Accounting Order), and the present appeals (involving the United States Basin 65
supplemental claims). This Court can and should resolve all of the appeals with an
understanding of the interlocking legal issues.
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III.

The Merits of the Supplemental Claims Should Be Resolved on Remand
The State asserts (State Br. at 39) that the United States’ supplemental claims raise issues

requiring “careful consideration” that should not be decided in this appeal, and that the appeal is
no place for “speculating about hypothetical injuries.” Similarly, Suez argues (Suez Br. at 22)
that the United States’ supplemental claims raise “complicated issues” on the merits that cannot
be decided on appeal but “would have to be remanded to the SRBA court.” Yet both the State
and Suez proceed to argue the merits of the claims and expound on the supposed harms that will
be unleashed if the supplemental claims are confirmed. These arguments misconstrue the
supplemental claims, are not pertinent to the appeal, and should be disregarded.
A.

The United States Presented Sufficient Proof of Its Supplemental Claims

As explained in the United States’ opening brief (U.S. Br. at 6 & n. 1), the United States’
supplemental claims are based on undisputed historic stream-flow data showing flows into the
Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs. The United States claimed a priority date of 1966 for its
supplemental claims because that was a year of historically high stream flows. The United States
averred that in 1966, like other years with flows in excess of available reservoir capacity, the
United States passed or released (for flood-control purposes) all stream flows in excess of the
flows stored for irrigation and power use. Based on these actual “diversions” (inflows), the
United States claimed the right to divert total annual inflow up to the amount recorded in 1966.
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But the United States expressly limited its “use” rights to the amounts previously decreed. 10 See
R. 20 (memo supporting supplemental claims); R. 824-29 (supplemental claims). In this manner,
the United States claimed beneficial use of the last flows into the reservoir before irrigation use
(i.e., the water physically stored after flood-control releases). In arguing (Suez Br. at 16-22) that
“it will be no easy task to prove * * * up” these rights, Suez erects imaginary “hurdles” (id. at
17) that vanish once the United States’ claims are properly construed.
First, Suez argues (id. at 18) that the United States “must show that the claimed water
was not diverted and put to beneficial use under some other right.” To the contrary, the United
States claims extra diversions only to account for waters that are passed and released through the
reservoir system and not appropriated for use. Because the supplemental claims do not assert
beneficial use rights (to store water for irrigation and power uses) beyond the amounts already
decreed, there is no threat of “hoarding or wasting” and the authorities Suez cites on those points
(id.) are inapposite. 11 Nor is the State correct in arguing (State Br. at 22), that the limited nature
of the supplemental claims is a question of “subjective” intent. When stating its claims, the
United States specifically provided that the “total quantity appropriated” — i.e., the amount

10

As explained (U.S. Br. at 5), the diversion right is reflected in the right claimed for storage; the
use right is reflected in the right claimed for irrigation and power use “from storage.”
11

Suez’s mathematical examples (Suez Br. at 19, 34) also fail to show “waste.” In one breath,
Suez mistakenly argues (id. at 34) that the physical “refill” that results from reservoir operation
under the flood-control rule curves (pp. 6-7, supra) constitutes an improper enlargement of use
rights. In the next breath, Suez concedes (Suez Br. at 19) that waters released during flood
control operations do “nothing” and are not a water “use.” Suez cannot have it both ways.
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nominally diverted under the rule that all inflows are diversions — would be “limited” to the
storage and use permitted under its decreed storage rights. R. 825, 827.
Second, Suez argues (id. at 19) that the United States cannot show beneficial use of the
“second fill” water. But there is no genuine dispute that the United States stored and delivered
water for irrigation and power during the years in question. Under Suez’s view (and IDWR’s
accounting procedures), the beneficial use was not “as of right” under the United States’ decreed
rights, because the diversion limits were satisfied by first-available flows, which were passed and
released before Reclamation fully filled the reservoirs and released water for irrigation use. But
this reinterpretation of the decreed rights (which prompted the need for the supplemental claims)
does not raise genuine disputes of fact about the beneficial use of “second fill” water.
Third, Suez argues (id. at 20) that the United States cannot show that “the additional
storage under the [supplemental claims] was reasonable and necessary.” Suez’s argument is
predicated on the general rule that diversions in excess of beneficial use are wasteful. See Ward
v. Kidd, 87 Idaho 216, 226-27, 392 P.2d 183, 190 (1964). This rule cannot reasonably be applied
in the context of IDWR’s accounting procedures for on-stream reservoirs, where unappropriated
inflows are counted as diversions. As the United States’ explained (U.S. Br. at 16) and as Suez
itself acknowledges in a footnote (Suez Br. at 42, n. 30), because the United States owes a duty
of care to downstream communities, the United States’ flood control operations are not “sloppy”
and “waste[ful]” as Suez otherwise argues (Suez Br. at 20), nor a mere matter of “convenience”
as the State implies (State Br. at 41). The United States reasonably “diverts” more water than
necessary to fill its reservoirs — i.e., reasonably passes and releases inflows that otherwise
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would be available to satisfy its storage rights — to meet its duty of care to downstream
communities.
B.

The United States’ Supplemental Claims Are Not a Collateral Attack on the
2003 Partial Decrees

The State and Suez’s failure to properly construe the United States’ supplemental claims
is also fatal to their arguments (State Br. at 40-44; Suez Br. at 24-26) that the supplemental
claims are a “collateral attack” on the 2003 partial decrees that reaffirmed the United States’
licensed and decreed rights for the Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs after the Payette
Adjudication was consolidated with the SRBA. See U.S. Br. at 4-5, 15-16. The State and Suez
do not contend that the 2003 partial decrees have claim-preclusive effect. See State Br. at 40-44;
Suez Br. at 24-26. Instead, they argue that the supplemental claims contradict limits allegedly
imposed in the 2003 partial decrees. Those implied limits do not exist.
The 2003 partial decrees are based on the 1986 Payette Decree and the prior State
licenses. The licenses confirmed rights to “use” water, for irrigation and power purposes, up to
specified amounts tied to reservoir capacity. R. 719-20. The licenses did not purport to limit
reservoir inflows to the stated amount of “use.” Id. Since the watersheds regularly produce
flows in excess of reservoir capacity and Reclamation had (and has) no ability to prevent
inflows, such an interpretation is untenable. The “refill” issue arose only after IDWR
determined, as a matter of water-rights accounting, that all inflows are to be counted as
diversions. The only right asserted in the supplemental claims that arguably goes beyond the
licensed and decreed rights is the claimed right, in years when total inflows exceed available
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reservoir capacity, to pass or release unneeded inflows before physically filling the reservoirs for
irrigation and power use. Because that issue was not presented in the proceedings on the 2003
partial decrees, the United States’ supplemental claims cannot be a collateral attack on those
decrees.
Nor is the State correct in arguing (State Br. at 40), that the United States “collaterally
attack[ed]” the 2003 partial decrees by noting Black Canyon’s objection that the supplemental
claims are unnecessary. Should this Court determine that reservoir inflows released for flood
control purposes cannot be counted toward reservoir storage rights — even as a matter of
administrative expedience — such a ruling plainly would not “impeach” the 2003 partial decrees.
See State Br. at 40 (citing Wright v. Atwood, 33 Idaho 455, 461, 195 P. 625, 627 (1921)). Such a
ruling would simply mean that the decrees must be implemented on their plain terms in
accordance with the conventional use of “diversion” (as limited to water appropriations).
C.

The United States Supplemental Claims Do Not Threaten Junior Users or
Water-Rights Administration
1.

The Supplemental Claims Cannot Injure Other Water Users

Finally, there is no support for the various assertions by the State (State Br. at 36-44) and
Suez (Suez Br. at 9, 18-19, 31, 37-38) that the United States’ supplemental claims threaten injury
to other water users or other “significant and adverse unintended consequences” (State Br. at 36).
As explained (pp. 9-10, supra), the United States’ flood-control operations — as distinct from
the storage of water for power and irrigation use — do not remove water from the Payette River
system; they impact water availability only as a matter of the timing of stream flows. If
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Reclamation were to fill the reservoirs with first-available flows, Reclamation would be
compelled to “spill” excess flows generally during times of peak flows and greatest flood risk.
When Reclamation began flood-control operations around 1957, Reclamation started passing and
releasing unneeded flows before fully filling the reservoirs in order to leave reservoir space for
capturing peak flows and potential flood waters. If the United States’ beneficial-use rights are
confirmed, these longstanding stream flow patterns would continue, and the United States would
retain priority rights in waters physically stored in the reservoirs.
The confirmation of these rights cannot injure other water users in the Payette River
system for two reasons. First, any user who appropriated water (and water rights) under the river
flow pattern that prevailed before federal flood-control operations began (or the 1966 priority
date of the supplemental claims) would have a senior right. Confirmation of the United States’
beneficial-use rights would not enable the United States to physically store any flows required to
satisfy senior (pre-1966) downstream rights. Second, any users who appropriated waters of the
Payette River system after 1966 acquired rights that are subject to the United States’ senior
beneficial-use rights and the river flow patterns resulting from flood-control operations.
Confirmation of the United States’ beneficial-use rights cannot injure junior (post-1966) users
because it would not alter the stream flows that were available to junior users when they acquired
their water rights and that would remain available for the satisfaction of those rights.
2.

The State and Suez Misconstrue the Supplemental Claims

Because the State and Suez cannot show injury in light of the above circumstances, they
rely instead on the notion that confirmation of the supplemental claims would cause “per se”
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injury. See State Br. at 37, 41-42; Suez Br. at 31, 37. As the State and Suez note (id.), an
increase in the amount of water diverted ordinarily constitutes an “enlargement” of a water right,
and there is “per se injury to junior water users anytime an enlargement receives priority.” City
of Pocatello v. Idaho, 152 Idaho 830, 835, 275 P.2d 845, 850 (2012) (quoting A & B Irrigation
Dist. v. Aberdeen-American Falls Ground Water Dist., 141 Idaho 746, 753, 118 P.3d 78, 85
(2005)). This “per se” injury rule was adopted, however, in the context of conventional
diversions associated with “enlarged use[s].” See A & B Irrigation Dist., 141 Idaho at 752, 118
P.3d at 84. Consistent with IDWR’s accounting rule (that all inflows are diversions), the United
States’ supplemental claims assert diversion rights greater than use rights (rights to store for
irrigation and power uses) solely to account for water passed through the reservoirs for floodcontrol purposes. More to the point, although the supplemental claims assert diversion rights
greater than the United States’ decreed rights (as interpreted by IDWR’s accounting rule), the
supplemental claims do not assert diversion rights greater than historical practice. The
supplemental claims simply describe historical practice in accordance with IDWR’s accounting
rule. In other words, even if the supplemental claims implicate an “enlargement” in relation to
the decreed rights, they do not seek such “enlargement” under the priority date of the decreed
rights. They claim a junior priority date (of 1966), matching the date of historical “diversions”
(inflows) toward beneficial use. Accordingly, the “per se” injury rule is not implicated.
The State and Suez also argue (State Br. at 37, 42-43, Suez Br. at 35-36) that the
supplemental claims must be improper because they would give the United States control over
all stream flows. As Suez acknowledges (Suez Br. at 40), however, on-stream reservoirs by
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“their very nature * * * control the entire river.” There is a fundamental difference between
(a) controlling the river to regulate stream flows for flood-control purposes, and (b) appropriating
all of the water of the river for beneficial use. By claiming the right to divert all flows (assuming
all inflows to be diversions), the United States is not claiming the right to appropriate all river
water or to control the distribution of all river water for water-rights purposes. In this regard, the
State and Suez are simply mistaken in their assertions that the supplemental claims, if confirmed,
would leave “no water legally available for use by junior appropriators,” State Br. at 37, 12 or
would “prevent future appropriations.” Suez Br. at 42. To be sure, confirmation of the
supplemental claims would preclude junior users from calling on water physically stored in the
Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs. But Reclamation must pass or release any water not needed
to physically fill the reservoirs up to the decreed storage rights, and any user is free to
appropriate or use any unappropriated flows, including all flows passed or released for floodcontrol purposes. Likewise, IDWR would remain free to monitor federal use of reservoir storage
rights (e.g., to ensure a single physical fill considering prior-year carry-over) and to permit and
license new appropriations of unappropriated water.
Finally, the State and Suez argue that confirmation of the supplemental claims would
alter the “historic status quo” established by IDWR’s 1993 accounting procedures, State Br. at

12

This quotation is from the State’s argument (State Br. at 37) addressing the alleged
consequences of allowing the United States’ decreed rights to remain in priority notwithstanding
flood-control releases. The State similarly makes essentially the same argument (id. at 42-43)
regarding the supplemental claims. The State is mistaken in both cases.
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36, and thus “diminish the priorities of junior water rights developed since [1993],” Suez Br. at 21.
But IDWR adopted the accounting procedures informally before the final adjudication of the United
States’ reservoir rights in the SRBA, the impact of the accounting procedures on the United States’
storage rights remains unresolved, and reservoir operations did not change. Thus, the mere adoption
of the 1993 accounting procedures did not alter the status quo for purposes of water appropriation.
Moreover, the principal import of the 1993 accounting procedures was to remove the United States’
ability to store water under its decreed rights after the date of “paper fill.” As Suez acknowledges
(Suez Br. at 35), the rationale for this rule — apart from mere administrative expedience — was to
“incentivize” the United States to store first-available flows and thus leave later-in-season stream
flows to other users. If the United States were to follow this course, flows after physical fill would
generally arrive downstream when seasonal river flows are the highest, when flood risks are greatest,
and when irrigators would have little (if any) ability to put the water to beneficial use. The State and
Suez do not argue that post-1993 appropriators relied on that outcome (which has yet to occur); nor
do they advocate for that result.
To the contrary, the State specifically notes (State Br. at 38, n. 44) that it is “not challenging
or objecting to federal flood control operations,” and Suez goes out of its way to construct a theory
(Suez Br. at 44-47) as to how Reclamation may continue to “capture” and store “excess” water after
“paper fill” as an “ancillary right.” These arguments betray the State’s and Suez’s true agenda. As
Suez acknowledges (Suez Br. at 45-46), the proposed “ancillary right” cannot be enforced in
“priority” against any other water user; it is merely the ability to store water (by sufferance) until any
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other water user claims it. 13 Thus, the “status quo” imagined by the State and Suez is one where
flood control operations continue and where the waters physically stored in the reservoirs (after
“paper fill”) are made available for distribution by IDWR to junior appropriators. In this manner, in
any year of flood-control releases, such other users would obtain the benefits of flood-control and
priority rights in the stored waters, notwithstanding the fact that these other users — unlike Black
Canyon and other contract space holders — do not pay for reservoir storage. See United States v.
Pioneer Irr. Dist., 144 Idaho 106, 114-115, 157 P.3d 600, 608-09 (2006) (contract space holders pay
share of reservoir construction and operations and maintenance costs).
While the State and Suez argue (State Br. at 39; Suez Br. at 44-46) that the United States and
the contract space holders have yet to be injured by the 1993 accounting procedures (which to date
have largely been a paper exercise), no water user needs to show injury as a precondition to asserting
beneficial use rights. Moreover, there can be no dispute that if the United States’ supplemental
claims are disallowed, the United States will be injured. The United States will lose the ability, in
years where inflows exceed available reservoir capacity, to exercise its storage rights as a matter of
right without discontinuing flood-control operations. It is no response for the State and Suez to argue
(id.) that actual harm has yet to occur.

13

Suez argues (Suez Br. at 45-46) that “no other right holder may call for [the] release” of
“excess” water, once captured in the federal reservoirs. When Reclamation physically stores
natural flows that are not needed for and cannot be used in association with downstream water
rights at the time of storage, the stored waters (which otherwise would be wasted) should not be
subject to later delivery calls. Cf. Washington County Irrigation Dist. v. Talboy, 55 Idaho 382,
386, 43 P.2d 943, 946 (1935) (“No one can make an appropriation from a reservoir * * * for the
obvious reason that the waters so stored * * * are already diverted and appropriated * * *). But
if Reclamation cannot store inflows after “paper fill” as a matter of right, the inflows (as natural
flows) would be subject to future appropriation by downstream users.
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IV.

The State and Suez Are Not Entitled To Attorney Fees
For reasons explained above and in the United States opening brief, the United States’

arguments on appeal are well grounded in law and fact and are meritorious. The State and Suez
have not demonstrated any basis for their claims (State Br. at 44; Suez Br. at 47) for attorneys’
fees under Idaho Code § 12-117, which authorizes attorney-fee awards to prevailing party only if
the “nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.”
In addition, the United States is not subject to attorney fee awards under Idaho Code
§ 12-117. As the State observes (State Br. at 44), the McCarran Amendment’s waiver of
sovereign immunity “submits the United States generally to state adjective law, as well as to
state substantive law of water rights.” United States v. Idaho ex rel. Director, Idaho Dept. of
Water Resources, 508 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (emphasis added) (construing 43 U.S.C. § 666(a)). But
this “general” submission to “state adjective law” is not absolute. Id. at 7. The United States
Supreme Court emphasized that waivers of sovereign immunity must be “unequivocally
expressed,” id. at 6, and that courts must be “particularly alert to require a specific waiver of
sovereign immunity before the United States may be held liable” for “monetary exactions * * *
in litigation.” Id. at 8-9.
The McCarran Amendment provides “[t]hat no judgment for costs shall be entered
against the United States.” 43 U.S.C. § 666(a). In light of this provision, the United States
Supreme Court held that Idaho may not collect filing fees from the United States under Idaho
Code § 42-1414, despite the State’s contention that filing fees are not like “costs,” a term
traditionally reserved for “items of expense incurred in litigation that a prevailing party is
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allowed by rule to tax against the losing party.” Idaho, 508 U.S. at 7-8. Attorneys’ fee awards
under Idaho Code § 12-117 are more like “costs” as defined above than the filing fees the United
States Supreme Court has already held to be non-recoverable. Given the proviso prohibiting a
judgment of “costs,” the McCarran Amendment cannot be construed as providing a “specific
waiver” for such attorneys’ fee awards. 14 See Idaho, 508 U.S. at 8-9.

14

At the time the McCarran Amendment was enacted, the United States was generally immune
from any method of cost-shifting in litigation, whether by a judgment for costs or by otherwise
requiring litigants to pay litigation expenses, attorneys’ fees, or interest. See United States v.
Chem. Found., 272 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1926) (recognizing the United States’ “sovereign prerogative
not to pay costs”); see also The Antelope, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 546, 550 (1827). If Congress had
intended to waive the United States’ long-standing immunity from costs and attorneys’ fees, it
would have done so explicitly. See United States Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615
(1992) (Congress is presumed to be aware of the “common rule” that “any waiver of the
Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocal”).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the United States’ opening brief (May
12, 2017), this Court should reverse the decision of the district court dismissing the United
States’ supplemental claims or, in the alternative, affirm the district court on the grounds that the
decreed rights for Cascade and Deadwood Reservoirs enable the United States to fill the
reservoirs up to the decreed amounts after releases for flood-control purposes.
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